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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATEOFUTAH, 
Plaintiff/ Appellee, 
V. Case No. 20160371-CA 
CHRISTOPHER ALLEN WELLS, 
Defendant/ Appellant. 
INTRODUCTION 
The trial court clearly and erroneously ruled that Mr. Wells could only bring his 
complaints about counsel on direct appeal. Wells' counsel also interpreted the incorrect 
rule and ineffectively failed to properly file the motion for new trial. And when Mr. Wells 
raised concerns that his counsel was inadequate, the court had a general obligation to 
inquire as to whether that dissatisfaction had to do with trial or with the upcoming 
sentencing. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
The court erroneously ruled that Mr. Wells would 
have to raise his motion for new trial on direct 
appeal, which prevented Mr. Wells :from properly 
raising his concerns. 
The State argues that the discussion regarding the motion for new trial was 
"informal" and that "the court did not make a ruling that day." Aple's Br. at 8. 
Additionally, the State claims that "the trial court advised Defendant the time to file the 
motion would not begin to run until after sentencing." Aple's Br. at 8 (emphasis in 
original). 
The trial court did not tell Mr. Wells that he could file a motion for new trial after 
sentencing. It said nothing of the sort. And the discussion was anything but informal. The 
court considered the deadlines from the Rules of Civil Procedure then ruled that Mr. 
Wells would have to raise his claims on appeal. First, Mr. Wells orally moved for new 
trial. The parties discussed Rule 59 of the Rules of Civil Procedure's requirement that a 
new trial motion be filed after entry of the judgment. R. 150-51. Then the following 
discussion took place: 
THE COURT: Here's where I'm struggling right now on the matter. The 
language of Rule 59 of the Utah Rules of Criminal -- of Civil Procedure 
talks about ten days from the entry of judgment. In a criminal context 
judgment includes sentencing. Judgment is not completed until sentencing. 
MR. WAYMENT: Good point. You're right. 
THE COURT: So I'm not -- I'm trying to figure out how to mesh that all 
together, that language, and I'm struggling with that just for a moment. If 
you'll give me just a little bit more --
MR. WAYMENT: Your right, your Honor, because it's after sentencing 
that the Court enters its --
THE COURT:Judgment. 
MR. WAYMENT: Right. 
THE COURT: That's the official judgment point. That's where I'm 
struggling. So I think it's -- I think it's going f1J ho:oe t,o be done under the appeal. 
It's going to have to be a situation of an appeal that your orig -- or that 
there was some error or inadequacy in your original trial. So sentencing is 
going to go forward today. 
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R. 151-52 (emphasis added). Contrary to the State's assertions, the court erroneously told 
Mr. Wells that he had to raise the issue on appeal. It did not tell him that he could raise 
the motion within IO days of sentencing (as Rule 24 of the Rules of Criminal Procedure 
allows). Nor did it tell him anything about when to raise the motion for new trial. 
The State also claims that Mr. Wells' oral motion did not qualify as a motion for 
new trial because his statement was "nothing more than an [ expression of] intent" to file 
a motion and was not made in writing. Aple's Br. at 9-10. Granted, Mr. Wells did not 
properly file his motion for new trial. But this is attributed to two key problems: I) the 
court's incorrect ruling that he would have to raise his issues on direct appeal and 2) his 
counsel's ineffective consideration of the wrong rule from the Rules of Civil Procedure 
rather than the appropriate Rule of Criminal Procedure. See Aplt's Br. at 4-9. 
When Mr. Wells orally raised the motion, both his counsel and the court should 
have told him that the motion needed to be filed in writing, within 10 days of sentence. 
Because both operated under a misunderstanding of the appropriate rule, and critically 
because the court told him that he would have to raise the issues on direct appeal, he 
should not be faulted for failing to make the proper filing. 
POINTII1 
Defense counsel ineffectively failed to properly file a 
motion for new trial as Mr. Wells requested 
The State acknowledges that counsel told the court a "legal reason why sentencing 
should be stayed or postponed" and acknowledges that counsel incorrectly believed "Mr. 
1 The following reflects point I.B. of Mr. Wells' brie£ He adopts the State's numbering for 
simplicity. 
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Wells' time to submit his motion has lapsed." Aple's Br. at 10-11. However, it claims that 
the discussion prior to sentencing and the limited record could not support a claim of 
ineffective assistance since Mr. Wells has not provided evidence of what occurred in 
private discussions with counsel before or after the oral motion, such as under Rule 23B 
of the Rules of Appellate Procedure. Aple's Br. at 11-13. 
Mr. Wells did not have to pursue a Rule 23B motion because the error is clear 
from the record. See Utah R. App. P. 23B(a) (the motion is appropriate only for facts "not 
fully appearing in the record"). 
The purpose of a rule 23B remand is to develop new evidence in the record, 
without which a defendant cannot bring his ineffective assistance of counsel 
claim on appeal. But if the facts necessary for an ineffective assistance of 
counsel determination are apparent on the record, there is no need for a 
remand for additional findings, and the motion should be denied. 
St,at,e v. Griffin, 2015 UT 18, 1 18, _ P.3d _. Because the facts are apparent in the 
record here, a remand would not be granted. 
On the record, trial counsel relied on the improper rule for the motion. R. 150-51. 
Then, he incorrectly told the court that Mr. Wells would be "outside" the time for filing a 
motion for new trial and that an appeal would have to be the appropriate remedy. R. 151 
("Well, we'd be outside of [the time period for filing a motion for new trial] with 
sentencing. That makes more sense, by the way. So other than that I think there's no 
legal reason. I think he'll want to appeal, but that happens after sentencing"). Thus, the 
record more than amply demonstrates counsel's ineffectiveness, which has been shown, 
4 
given the State's concession that counsel relied on the wrong rule. See Aple's Br. at 11 
("defense counsel suggested the applicability of an incorrect rule ... "). 
POINT III 
A pre-sentence com.plaint about counsel requires the 
court to conduct at least a basic inquiry into the 
issue and if the com.plaint relates to the upcoming 
sentencing, the court must conduct a full Pursifell 
inquiry. 
The State argues that because Mr. Wells made his complaint about counsel after 
trial, the Pursifell jurisprudence does not apply. Aple's Br. at 14-15. This contention is 
incorrect because Mr. Wells' complaint could have also been about counsel's 
representation at sentencing. 
In St,ate v. Hall, this court clarified that "the Pursifell procedure does not apply in 
cases where the defendant raises his dissatisfaction with counsel's trial performance after the 
trial is complete." St,at.e v. Hall, 2013 UT App 4, ,I 14, 294 P.3d 632 (citing S!Llt.e v. Franco, 
2012 UT App 200, 283 P.3d 1004) (emphasis added). The court continued, "[t]he reason 
for this distinction is evident: post-trial substitution of counsel cannot protect a 
defendant's right to adequate representation at trial." Id. ( emphasis added). 
But Mr. Wells' complaints were not necessarily limited to the trial. See Franco, 2012 
UT App. 200, 1 5 n. 2 ("While Franco expressed dissatisfaction with counsel several 
months prior to sentencing, he does not challenge on appeal counsel's performance at 
sentencing."). Mr. Wells told the court the basis for the motion "is the fact that his 
Counsel was inadequate." R. 150. 
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While the record is admittedly scant, this is not Mr. Wells' fault. He alerted the 
court that he believed his counsel was inadequate. Did he mean inadequate at trial or 
inadequate at trial and for the upcoming sentencing? Had the court conducted a Pursi.Jell 
inquiry, the court could have known whether the complaint was about trial or about the 
trial and future representation. Absent at least some sort of inquiry, the court went 
forward with insufficient information and potentially allowed Mr. Wells to be sentenced 
with counsel with whom he had conflicts. 
Under Hall and Franco, if a defendant expresses dissatisfaction with counsel before 
sentencing, the court at least has some obligation to generally question the defendant to 
ascertain whether the dissatisfaction has to do with conduct at the trial-in which case a 
detailed Pursi.fell inquiry is not required-or if it also has to do with the upcoming 
sentencing-in which case the court must then conduct a full Pursi.fell inquiry to avoid the 
constitutional violation of forcing the defendant to go forward with conflicted counsel. 
Stole v. Pursifell, 746 P.2d 270, 274 (Utah Ct. App. 1987) ("When a defendant is forced to 
stand trial with the assistance of an attorney with whom he has become embroiled in an 
irreconcilable conflict, he is deprived of the effective assistance of any counsel whatsoever 
and his Sixth Amendment right to counsel is violated." (internal quotation marks 
omitted)). Conflict-free counsel at sentencing is protected by the Sixth Amendment, so at 
a minimum, the court must ascertain whether the conflict has to do with the upcoming 
proceeding. Sto,t,e v. Lovell, 1999 UT 40, ,I 22, 984 P.2d 382, 387 (At a sentencing 
proceeding, "[t]he right to conflict-free representation is guaranteed by the Sixth 
Amendment"). 
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Mr. Wells invoked the Pursi.fell jurisprudence when he revealed the conflict to the 
court. At that point, the court had at least a general obligation to ascertain whether the 
conflict had to do with trial or with the upcoming sentencing. Its failure to conduct the 
mqwry was erroneous. 
CONCLUSION 
This court should reverse and remand, giving Mr. Wells an opportunity to 
properly file his motion for new trial, and to address his dissatisfaction with his appointed 
counsel. 
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